F5 (C3D) Client Certificate Constrained Delegation
Everything You Need to Know
Table of Contents:
- Overview
- Core Components
- Prerequisites
- Configuration
- Validation
- Troubleshooting
- Conclusion
This feature allows the BIG-IP to forge a client certificate for use in server-side client certificate authentication. The forged certificate is generated using information from a client certificate provided in the client-side ssl handshake.
Overview: What is F5 C3D?
F5 Client Certificate Constrained Delegation (C3D) is a feature on F5 BIG-IP that lets you inspect and secure encrypted traffic—even when both the client & backend server require mutual TLS (mTLS) authentication. C3D does this by validating the client’s certificate, then generating a temporary certificate to present to the backend server, so the secure chain is preserved while still allowing traffic inspection.
Why You Need to Know About It
- See Inside Encrypted Traffic: C3D lets you inspect mTLS traffic for threats or compliance without breaking end-to-end security.
- Stay Compliant: Keeps mutual authentication intact, which is required for many regulated industries.
- Flexible Security: Enables advanced policies and integrations (like OCSP checks) while maintaining strong encryption.
- Solves a Real Problem: Perfect for organizations that need both deep traffic inspection and strict mTLS security.
In short: F5 C3D lets you have both strong mTLS security and the visibility your security team needs.
Core Components
These are the essential building blocks that make F5 C3D work for secure mTLS inspection and certificate delegation:
- C3D Client SSL Profile: Authenticates incoming client certificates and manages the initial TLS handshake from the client side. It ensures only trusted clients are allowed through by validating their certificates.
- C3D Server SSL Profile: Generates and presents a temporary (forged) client certificate to the backend server. This enables the F5 to create a secure mTLS session with the backend, maintaining end-to-end encryption.
- Trusted CA Bundle: A set of certificate authorities (CAs) that the F5 uses to validate client certificates. Only certificates from these trusted CAs will be accepted.
- OCSP Responder (Optional): Provides real-time certificate revocation checking. F5 can use this to ensure client certificates are still valid and haven’t been revoked.
Prerequisites
Before you implement F5 Client Certificate Constrained Delegation (C3D), make sure you have the following prerequisites in place:
-
F5 BIG-IP Version:
C3D is supported on BIG-IP 13.0 and above, & for the latest features and easier integration, version 17.1.0+ is recommended. -
Valid Server Certificate and Key:
You need a public-facing server certificate & private key for the Client SSL profile, which will be presented to clients connecting to the F5. -
Trusted CA Bundle:
A bundle of certificate authorities (CAs) that the F5 will use to validate incoming client certificates. This ensures only trusted client certificates are accepted. -
OCSP Responder (Optional but Recommended):
For real-time client certificate revocation checking, configure an OCSP responder. This helps verify that client certificates haven’t been revoked. -
Backend Server Trust:
The backend server must trust the CA that the F5 uses to sign the forged client certificates. This is essential for successful mTLS authentication. -
Network and Access:
Ensure network connectivity between the F5, backend servers, and OCSP responder.
Configuration
Complete guide including CA creation, SSL profiles, and trust configuration.
-
Step 1: Generate Dedicated C3D CA Hierarchy
Create Root and Intermediate CAs using OpenSSL# Generate Root CA (4096-bit RSA, 10-year validity) openssl genrsa -out C3D_Root_CA.key 4096 openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key C3D_Root_CA.key -sha384 -days 3650 \ -subj "/CN=F5-C3D-Root-CA/O=Security/OU=C3D" -out C3D_Root_CA.crt # Generate Intermediate CA (for forged certificates) openssl genrsa -out C3D_Intermediate_CA.key 4096 openssl req -new -key C3D_Intermediate_CA.key \ -subj "/CN=F5-C3D-Intermediate-CA/O=Security/OU=C3D" \ -out C3D_Intermediate_CA.csr openssl x509 -req -in C3D_Intermediate_CA.csr -CA C3D_Root_CA.crt \ -CAkey C3D_Root_CA.key -CAcreateserial -sha384 -days 1825 \ -out C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt
-
Step 2: Client SSL Profile (F5 GUI)
Path: Local Traffic > Profiles > SSL > Client > CreateBasic Settings:- Name:
c3d_client_profile
- Parent Profile:
/Common/clientssl
- Certificate: Public-facing cert (e.g.,
app.acme.com.crt
) - Key:
app.acme.com.key
- Client Certificate: Require
- Trusted CAs: Upload
C3D_Root_CA.crt
- Frequency:
Once
(orAlways
for strict) - Advertised Certificate Authorities:
C3D_Root_CA.crt
- Certificate Constrained Delegation: Enabled
- Signing CA Bundle:
C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt
- Name:
-
Step 3: Server SSL Profile (F5 GUI)
Path: Local Traffic > Profiles > SSL > Server > CreateBasic Settings:- Name:
c3d_server_profile
- Parent Profile:
/Common/serverssl
- Certificate:
C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt
- Key:
C3D_Intermediate_CA.key
- Certificate Constrained Delegation: Enabled
- CA Certificate:
C3D_Root_CA.crt
- CA Key:
C3D_Root_CA.key
- Certificate Lifetime:
3600
(1 hour)
Field Value Purpose Certificate/Key Intermediate CA Signs forged client certificates CA Certificate/Key Root CA Root of trust chain - Name:
-
Step 4: Backend Server Trust Configuration
Servers must trust the C3D Intermediate CALinux (Update CA Trust):sudo cp C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/ sudo update-ca-certificates systemctl restart nginx/apache
Windows (Cert Manager):- Run
certlm.msc
- Import
C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt
to Trusted Root Certification Authorities
- Run
# Check forged certificate details openssl s_client -connect app.acme.com:443 -servername app.acme.com \ -showcerts 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -issuer -subject # Expected output: Issuer: CN=F5-C3D-Intermediate-CA Subject: CN=original.client.com (forged)Troubleshooting Table:
Issue | Solution |
---|---|
"Certificate verify failed" on server | Confirm backend trusts C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt |
No forged certificates generated | Verify C3D enabled in both SSL profiles |
Validation
After configuring C3D, use these methods to validate end-to-end functionality from client to backend server.
-
Client-Side Validation
Verify client certificate presentation and forged cert generation# Basic connection test openssl s_client -connect app.acme.com:443 -servername app.acme.com \ -cert client.pem -key client.key -CAfile Public_CA.crt -state -debug # Expected output: Verify return code: 0 (ok) subject=CN = original.client.com issuer=CN = F5-C3D-Intermediate-CA
Key checks:- "Client Certificate" appears in debug output
- Final certificate issuer matches C3D Intermediate CA
- Return code 0 (success)
-
F5-Side Validation
Confirm decryption and certificate forging# Capture decrypted traffic (F5 CLI) tcpdump -ni 0.0:nnnp -s0 -vvv 'port 443' -w /var/tmp/c3d_capture.pcap # Check forged certificates tmsh show ltm c3d sessions detail | grep -E 'Client|Issuer' # Expected output: Client: CN=original.client.com Issuer: CN=F5-C3D-Intermediate-CA
Wireshark analysis:- Client Hello shows original client cert
- Server Hello shows forged cert from C3D CA
- Decrypted HTTP headers visible in F5→backend traffic
-
Server-Side Validation
Verify backend receives valid forged certificatesNGINX/Apache logs:tail -f /var/log/nginx/ssl.log # Expected entry: SSL_CLIENT_S_DN: CN=original.client.com (Issuer: CN=F5-C3D-Intermediate-CA)
Windows Event Viewer:Event ID 36886 (Schannel): A TLS client certificate was received and validated. Subject: CN=original.client.com Issuer: CN=F5-C3D-Intermediate-CA
-
OCSP Validation (If Configured)
# Verify OCSP response openssl ocsp -issuer C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt -cert client.pem \ -url http://ocsp.acme.com -resp_text # Expected output: Cert Status: good This Update: Jun 16 12:20:00 2025 GMT
Layer | Test | Success Criteria |
---|---|---|
Client | SSL handshake | No errors, issuer=C3D Intermediate CA |
F5 | tcpdump analysis | Visible decrypted payloads |
Server | Log verification | Accepted forged certs |
Troubleshooting
Diagnose and resolve common issues in C3D implementations using this structured approach.
-
Connection Flow with SNAT
Understand each step to isolate failures1. Client Initiation: - Client → F5 VIP:443 (ClientHello with original cert) 2. F5 Processing: - Validates client cert against Trusted CA - Decrypts traffic for inspection - Applies SNAT (e.g., 192.168.1.100) - Generates forged cert using Server SSL Profile CA 3. Backend Communication: - F5 (SNAT IP) → Backend:443 (ClientHello with forged cert) - Server validates forged cert against C3D CA 4. Response Handling: - Backend → F5 (encrypted with forged cert) - F5 re-encrypts with original client cert - Client receives response via original TLS session
-
Troubleshooting Methodology
Layer-by-layer diagnostics1. Client-Side Checks:# Verify certificate chain openssl verify -CAfile Public_CA.crt client.pem # Test bypassing F5 (direct to backend) openssl s_client -connect backend.acme.com:443 -cert client.pem -key client.key
2. F5-Side Checks:# Check C3D session status tmsh show ltm c3d sessions # Verify SSL profiles tmsh list ltm profile client-ssl c3d_client_profile tmsh list ltm profile server-ssl c3d_server_profile # SNAT verification tmsh show ltm snat-translations | grep -B 4 "Virtual Server"
3. Backend-Side Checks:# Verify CA trust store openssl verify -CAfile /etc/ssl/certs/C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt forged_cert.pem # Check firewall rules ss -tulpn | grep 443
4. Full Transaction Capture:# Simultaneous captures tcpdump -ni 1.1 'host 203.0.113.10' -w /var/tmp/client-side.pcap & tcpdump -ni 1.2:nnnp 'net 192.168.1.0/24' -w /var/tmp/backend-side.pcap & # Replace VIP_IP and BACKEND_IPs with actual values tcpdump -nni 0.0:nnnp -s0 '(host VIP_IP and port 443) or (host BACKEND_IP1 or host BACKEND_IP2)' -w /var/tmp/targeted_capture.pcap
-
Common Errors & Solutions
Symptom Possible Cause Solution "Peer certificate cannot be authenticated" Backend doesn't trust C3D CA Reimport C3D_Intermediate_CA.crt to server trust store No SNAT translation occurring Missing SNAT pool in Virtual Server Attach SNAT pool to virtual server configuration OCSP response "trylater" OCSP responder overloaded Implement OCSP stapling or caching SSL Handshake fails after SNAT Backend ACL blocking SNAT IP Add firewall rule for SNAT pool IP range Certificate "issuer missing" error Incomplete CA chain in Server SSL Profile Include full chain (Root → Intermediate) in profile Intermittent connection resets Forged certificate lifetime too short Increase Certificate Lifetime in Server SSL Profile -
Advanced Diagnostics
Use these commands for deep inspection# Verify forged certificate details tmsh show ltm c3d certificates | grep -A 4 "Subject DN" # Check TLS version mismatch tcpdump -nnvr capture.pcap 'tls.handshake.version == 0x0303' | wc -l # Test SNAT path independently curl -vk https://backend.acme.com --local-addr 192.168.1.100 # Monitor real-time connections watch -n 1 "tmsh show ltm connection cs-server-addr 192.168.1.20"
Start │ ├─ Client connection fails │ ├─ OpenSSL handshake error? → Verify Client SSL Profile │ │ ├─ Check Trusted CA Bundle matches client cert issuer [1][3] │ │ └─ Confirm C3D enabled in Client SSL Profile [3] │ │ │ └─ No forged cert generated? → Check Server SSL Profile │ ├─ Verify CA Certificate/Key in Server Profile [3][5] │ └─ Confirm Certificate Lifetime > 0 [5] │ ├─ Backend rejects connection │ ├─ Server trust issue? → Validate C3D CA in backend trust store [2] │ │ │ └─ TLS version mismatch? → Check Server Profile ciphers [4] │ ├─ Compare with backend's accepted protocols │ └─ Useopenssl s_client -cipher
to test │ └─ Intermittent failures ├─ OCSP/CRL issues? → Test responder connectivity [3] │ ├─openssl ocsp
command verification │ └─ Check firewall rules for OCSP port (TCP/2560) │ └─ SNAT problems? → Verify pool configuration ├─tmsh show ltm snat-translations
└─ Confirm return route for SNAT IP exists
Conclusion
Mastering F5 Client Certificate Constrained Delegation (C3D) empowers you to deliver secure, compliant, and deeply visible traffic flows in environments where mutual TLS (mTLS) is a must and inspection is non-negotiable. Throughout this guide, we’ve broken down the essentials:
- Overview: You learned how C3D bridges the gap between end-to-end mTLS and the need for security inspection, enabling organizations to maintain both compliance and deep visibility.
- Core Components: We covered the critical building blocks—client and server SSL profiles, dedicated CA hierarchies, and optional OCSP responders—each playing a unique role in the C3D handshake and certificate forging process.
- Prerequisites: You now know the importance of having the right BIG-IP version, valid certificates, trusted CA bundles, and backend trust configuration before you even start implementation.
- Configuration: Step-by-step, you saw how to generate and import CAs, set up client and server SSL profiles with C3D enabled, and ensure backend servers trust the correct CA chain—never using default certificates for production.
- Validation: We explored practical validation techniques, from OpenSSL client tests to F5 command-line checks and backend server log verification, ensuring every link in the chain is working as expected.
- Troubleshooting: You’re equipped with a full connection flow breakdown, targeted tcpdump examples, and a flowchart for diagnosing issues—from SNAT misconfigurations to incomplete CA chains and OCSP timeouts.
Key Takeaways:
- Always use a dedicated CA for C3D certificate forging—never default or reused certs.
- Enable C3D in both client and server SSL profiles, and double-check all trust relationships.
- Validate each step: client handshake, F5 certificate forging, backend acceptance, and SNAT behavior.
- Leverage tcpdump with the
:nnnp
flag and targeted filters for end-to-end visibility. - Troubleshoot methodically, focusing on CA trust, SNAT, and OCSP/CRL status.
With these practices, you’ll be able to deploy, validate, and troubleshoot F5 C3D confidently, ensuring both security and operational transparency in even the most demanding environments.
Happy securing—and may your mTLS always be both trusted and visible!